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NOTES
DISCRETIONARY COMMODITY ACCOUNTS:
ARE THEY SECURITIES AND DOES
IT REALLY MATTER?
A discretionary commodity account is a popular investment vehicle
for trading in commodity futures contracts. In a discretionary commo-
dity account, the account holder deposits cash assets with a registered
broker.2 The investor grants the broker authority to make transactions
using the account assets without the investor's prior consent.' By using a
discretionary account, an investor takes advantage of the broker's ex-
pertise in the highly complex futures industry.4 In addition, a discre-
See Note, Discretionary Commodity Account as "Securities". Applying the Howey
Investment Contract Test to a New Investment Medium, 67 GEO. L.J. 269, 269 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as New Investment Medium]. A commodity futures contract is a stan-
dardized agreement for the purchase or sale of a certain amount of a specified commodity to
be delivered at a future month. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622
F.2d 216, 220 (6th Cir. 1980). Since the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction applies only to futures
contracts, a futures contract must be distinguished from a forward contract which also pro-
vides for delivery at a subsequent date. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); see Guttman, The Futures
Trading Act of 1978: The Reaffirmation of CFTC-SEC Coordinated Jurisdiction Over
Security/Commodities, 28 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Guttman]. A
forward contract provides a fixed price lasting throughout the term of the contract and is
undertaken with the expectation of delivery. Id. at 17. A futures contract, however, is
primarily a device for speculation or hedging and actual delivery rarely occurs. Id. at 17.
The price of a futures contract is not fixed and changes every day according to demand for
futures in that commodity. Id. For indepth discussions of futures trading and its advantages
see H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Appendix I), reprinted in General
Guide, CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1301-17 (1974); Clark, Genealogy and Genetics of "Con-
tract of Sale of a Commodity For Future Delivery" in the Commodity Exchange Act, 27
EMORY L.J. 1175 (1978).
2 See Russo & Lyon, The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57, 78-79 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Russo & Lyon]; Com-
ment, Reflections of 10b-5 in the 'Pool" of the Commodity Futures Antifraud, 14 Hous. L.
REv. 899, 902 & n.32 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Reflections]. Complex and technical factors
characterize futures trading. New Investment Medium, supra note 1, at 269. Most in-
vestors, unlike brokers, lack access to market data and methods of computer programming
devised by experts. See Reflections, supra, at 902 & n.32. A significant advantage of a
discretionary commodity account is that it allows an investor to participate in futures
trading without detailed knowledge of trading. See Selig, Managed Programs and Discre-
tionary Accounts, in COMMODITIES AND FUTURES TRADING 151, 153 (Prac. Law Inst. 1975). For
a study of the mechanics of trading in commodity futures, see Bianco, The Mechanics of
Futures Trading: Speculation and Manipulation, 6 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 27 (1977).
1 Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221 (6th Cir.
1980); Bromberg, Commodities Law and Securities Law-Overlaps and Preemptions, 1 J.
CORP. L. 217, 248 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Overlaps].
See note 2 supra.
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tionary account enables a broker to make transactions with the speed
necessary to keep up with the sharp price fluctuations in the markets.'
The discretionary commodity account however, has created a jurisdic-
tional conflict between commodities laws and securities laws.' While the
discretionary commodity account normally involves the trading of com-
modities or commodity futures, the account itself may fall within the
broad definition of a security.'
Congress enacted the Commodity Exchange Act of 19368 in an effort
to regulate commodity futures trading.9 Prior to 1974, however, much of
the commodity futures industry remained unregulated." In an attempt
to fill the regulatory gaps, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) asserted jurisdiction over aspects of the commodity industry." A
number of courts also fostered securities laws protection for commodity
investors by holding that discretionary commodity accounts constitute
securities under the federal securities laws." As a result, the accounts
were subject to SEC regulations as well as federal securities statutes.1
3
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974" (1974 Act),
however, substantially amended the Commodity Exchange Act.'5 In re-
' See 622 F.2d at 221; Overlaps, supra note 3, at 248. Placing discretion in a broker
may lead to serious problems. See New Investment Medium, supra note 1, at 270. Naive
commodity investors are often victims of misrepresentations as to the potential profits and
losses, broker's incompetence, and the investment market. Id.
' See Russo & Lyon, supra note 2, at 59, 64-72.
' See, e.g., Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 525-26 (5th Cir. 1978); Berman v.
Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Overlaps, supra
note 3, at 221-24. Bare commodities or futures contracts are not securities because the in-
vestor's expectation of profits arise from market price fluctuations rather than promoter ex-
pertise. See McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (E.D. La. 1972), affd per
curiam, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973); text accompanying notes 56-57 infra.
8 Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976)).
' See id.
10 See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1974) (enumeration of regulated com-
modities prior to 1974); Russo & Lyon, supra note 2, at 60 (substantial increase in trading of
unregulated commodities in late 1960's and early 1970's); S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 11-15, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5852-56 (background of
federal regulation of futures trading). See also Guttman, supra note 1, at 9-11 (1974 revi-
sions of commodity laws long overdue).
" See Guttman, supra note 1, at 11-12; Russo & Lyon, supra note 2, at 60-61. Prompted
to protect investors from fraud, the SEC expanded its jurisdiction over naked options. Gutt-
man, supra note 1, at 11. A naked option is an option in which the writer of the option does
not own the underlying commodity or commodity futures contract. Russo & Lyon, supra
note 2, at 60 n.9. One naked option scheme cost investors an estimated $70 million. Id. at 61.
12 See, e.g., Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 133-34 (8th Cir. 1970)
(remedy under securities laws for churning commodity account); Berman v. Orimex Trading,
Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (discretionary account to trade in cocoa futures
was investment contract within meaning of 1933 Act); Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F.
Supp. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (joint account to trade commodity futures was security).
1 See Guttman, supra note 1, at 11-12.
, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976)).
IS Russo & Lyon, supra note 2, at 57. The Commodity Exchange Act has been further
amended by the Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (1978)
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sponse to the need for regulatory reform of the futures industry, the
amended Commodity Exchange Act established the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission 6 (CFTC) and vested the new commission with ex-
clusive jurisdiction to regulate trading in commodity futures.' Although
Congress' grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC preempted SEC
regulation of discretionary commodity accounts, 8 investors continue to
bring private causes of action for violations of the securities statutes
when their discretionary commodity accounts are traded improperly.19
A few commentators contend that while the 1974 Act preempted
SEC regulatory authority over commodity interests, the 1974 Act did
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (Supp. III 1979)). See generally Guttman, supra note 1; Young, A
Test of Federal Sunset. Congressional Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, 27 EMORY L.J. 853 (1978).
"8 See 7 U.S.C. § 4a(a) (1976). See generally Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission: Newest of Each Exchange's Management Team, in COMMODITIES AND FUTURES
TRADING 131 (Prac. Law Inst. 1975).
" 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2(a) provides "[t]hat the Commission shall have exclusive
jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agreements (including... an "option" .. .), and trans-
actions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on
a contract market ... " Id. For a discussion of the factors leading to the congressional grant
of exclusive jurisdiction, see Russo & Lyon, supra note 2, at 60-62.
See Tendick & Gaine, Introducing the Regulator: The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, 35 Bus. LAW 751, 758 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Introducing the Regulator].
Legislative history indicates that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC preempted
SEC authority over commodity interest. A Senate report, considering the 1974 amendments
to the Commodity Exchange Act, states that the CFTC's jurisdiction supersedes that of
state as well as federal agencies. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5848; see note 21 infra. A House report added
that the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction would preempt the field as far as regulations are con-
cerned. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5894, 5897; see note 21 infra. Representative Poage remarked during considera-
tion of the 1974 amendments that the CFTC's jurisdiction did not supersede the SEC's
jurisdiction except to the extent that it involves futures trading. 120 CONG. REO 34736-37
(1974).
Congress never seriously considered placing regulatory authority over the futures in-
dustry in the SEC. See Hewitt, The Line Between Commodities and Securities-Part I, 1
AGRIC. L.J. 291, 306-09 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hewitt]; Russo & Lyon, supra note 2, at
60-64. Members of the commodity industry opposed SEC jurisdiction. See Russo & Lyon,
supra note 2, at 61-63. The industry urged Congress to vest regulation in a single agency
other than the SEC. See id. Since both the states and the SEC are the source of the
securities laws and the laws sometimes conflict, the commodity industry generally believed
that regulation of the industry under the securities laws was inappropriate. See id. In addi-
tion, Congress doubted the competency of the SEC with respect to futures trading because
of the dissimilarities between futures and securities. See 119 CONG. REc. 41335 (1973)
(remarks of Rep. Poage); Guttman, supra note 1, at 12-13 & nn. 74, 75.
19 See, e.g., Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345,
1350-51 (D. Nev. 1980); see Bromberg, Securities Law-Relationship to Commodities Law,
35 Bus. LAW. 787, 795 & n.28 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bromberg]. A distinction may be
made between agency rules and securities statutes that would permit preemption of SEC
rules without affecting the applicability of the securities acts. See 492 F. Supp. at 1350-51;
Bromberg, supra at 795 n.28; text accompanying notes 20-24 infra. But see text accompany-
ing notes 149-73 infra.
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not preempt the application of the securities acts." Since the language of
the amended Commodity Exchange Act speaks only in terms of agency
jurisdiction,"' the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction is arguably limited to
regulatory matters and administrative enforcement." The language of
the Commodity Exchange Act does not preclude commodity interests
from the definition of a security or from being the subject of private ac-
tions brought under securities statutes. The commentators assert,
therefore, that commodity interests which fall within the definition of a
securities may continue to be the subject of private actions under the
securities acts.
2 4
Although the remedies available to the investor under the Commo-
dity Exchange Act are extensive,2 private suits under the Securities
Act of 193326 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' (1934
Act) remain advantageous to the aggrieved commodity investor.28 For
I' See, e.g., Bromberg, supra note 19, at 795 & n.28; New Investment Medium, supra
note 1, at 272 n.24; text accompanying notes 21-24 infra. Not all commentators advocate the
continued application 'f securities statutes to private actions involving commodity transac-
tions. See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 324; text accompanying notes 149-73 infra.
21 See Nathan, The Continued Relevance of the Securities Laws to Certain
Commodity-Related Transactions, in COMMODITIES AND FUTURES TRADING 201, 213-14 (Prac.
Law Inst. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Nathan]. Legislative history on § 2(a) of the Commodity
Exchange Act may support the contention that securities statutes are still applicable to
discretionary commodity accounts. See Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith,
Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345, 1350 (D. New. 1980). A Senate report states:
The Committee amendment retains the provision of the House bill but adds
three clarifying amendments. The clarifying amendments make clear that (a) the
Commission's jurisdiction over futures contract markets or other exchanges is ex-
clusive and includes the regulation of... commodity options; (b) the Commission's
jurisdiction, where applicable, supersedes State as well as Federal agencies; and
(c) Federal and State courts retain their jurisdiction.
S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5843, 5848 [hereinafter cited as Senate-Report]. A House report adds "[u]nder the exclusive
grant of jurisdiction to the Commission, the authority in the Commodity Exchange Act (and
the regulations issued by the Commission) would preempt the field insofar as futures
regulation is concerned. (emphasis added)." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. -,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5894, 5897 [hereinafter cited as House
Report]. The two reports suggest that Congress was concerned only with regulatory
jurisdiction.
I See New Investment Medium, supra note 1, at 272 n.24. The CFTC asserted, in In-
terpretative Letter No. 77-2, that a discretionary commodity account is beyond the jurisdic-
tion of all other state or federal agencies. [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,257, at 21,371 (Jan. 14, 1977). The CFTC did not assert expressly, however, that
its grant of jurisdiction preempted private actions under the securities acts. See id.
Bromberg, supra note 19, at 795; Nathan, supra note 21, at 214; see Overlaps, supra
note 3, at 310.
24 See, e.g., Bromberg, supra note 19, at 795; New Investment Medium, supra note 1,
at 272 n.24.
See note 18 supra; text accompanying notes 159-68 infra.
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
, See New Investment Medium, supra note 1, at 272-73; text accompanying notes
29-34 infra.
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example, section 12(1) of the 1933 Act permits an investor to recover his
assets from his broker simply by showing that the broker failed to
register the account.29 Section 12(1) has no counterpart under com-
modities law because the Commodity Exchange Act does not require
dealers to register commodities." In addition, while the Commodity Ex-
change Act includes antifraud provisions comparable to those of the
securities acts," case law under the securities acts is more fully
developed and generally favorable to the plaintiff.32 Investors, finding
securities cases readily adaptable to commodity situations, can more
easily argue a theory under the developed securities laws than a theory
under the undeveloped commodities laws. 3 These advantages continue
to prompt investors to attempt to classify their discretionary commodity
accounts as securities.
3 4
Two district courts recently reached decisions that support the con-
tention that investors have private actions under the securities statutes
for improper commodity trading 5 In Mullis v. Merrill Lynch3 8 the plain-
tiff alleged violations of state and federal securities laws for the defen-
- 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976). Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, id. § 77e, requires
registration of securities. Id. Section 12 provides a rescissionary type remedy that permits
an investor to recover the consideration paid for securities that are not registered in com-
pliance with § 5. See id. § 771. Thus, if a discretionary commodity account is a security sub-
ject to § 5 and § 12 of thI 1933 Act and is not registered in compliance with § 5, an investor
could get his investment back without the need to show fraud by the broker. See Bines,
Regulating Discretionary Management Broker-Dealers as Catalysts for Reform, 16 B.C. IN-
DUS. & Com. L. REV. 347, 355-56 (1975).
' Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act Preemption as Public
Policy, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Preemption as Public Policy].
", See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 321 & n.169. Commodities laws contain several anti-
fraud provisions. See id. The main antifraud provision, § 4b of the Commodity Exchange
Act, concerns fraud in connection with commodity futures contracts traded on contract
markets. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976); see Overlaps, supra note 3, at 272-75. Section 4o(1) covers
fraud with respect to commodity trading advisors and commodity pool operators. 7 U.S.C. §
6o(1) (1976). The CFTC has promulgated antifraud regulations covering foreign futures
transactions. 17 C.F.R. 30.02 (1980), leverage or margin transactions (bullion and coins), 17
C.F.R. 31.03 (1980), and commodity options, 17 C.F.R. 32.9 (1980). In many respects, the com-
modities provisions are patterned after securities laws. See Bromberg, supra note 19, at
788-90; Overlaps, supra note 3, at 276-77 & n.240; Preemption as Public Policy, supra note
30, at 36-37.
3 See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 321; New Investment Medium, supra note 1, at 272-73.
' See note 32 supra.
" See Note, Discretionary Accounts, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 401, 413 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Discretionary Accounts]. The commentator argues that commodity investors will
continue to assert failure to register violations under § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. Id.
Several private actions brought after 1974 have alleged § 5 violations. See, e.g., Curran v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 1980); Meredith v.
ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107, at 24,459 (D.D.C. Nov.
24, 1980).
' See Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345,
1350-51 (D. New. 1980); Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp. 337, 345 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
' 492 F. Supp. 1345 (D. Nev. 1980).
1981]
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dant's careless and fraudulent handling of the plaintiff's discretionary
commodity accounts."7 Defendant Merrill Lynch asserted that the
CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction preempts the application of securities
laws to a commodity account even though the account was within the
definition of a security. 8 The district court rejected the defendant's
argument by distinguishing agency jurisdiction from court jurisdiction. 9
The court reasoned that while section 2(a) of the Commodity Exchange
Act preempts SEC regulation of a commodity account, the section ex-
pressly preserves the jurisdiction of the courts." The Mullis court also
rejected prior decisions that refused to permit private actions under the
securities statutes.4 ' The court reasoned that these decisions had not
fully recognized the significance of the distinction between agency
jurisdiction and court jurisdiction.42 The court held, therefore, that
federal courts have jurisdiction to apply federal securities acts to
private liability claims involving commodity transactions."3
In Westlake v. Abrams,4 the defendant moved for summary judg-
ment on plaintiff's claims based on securities laws violations in the sale
of commodity options.45 The district court adopted the Mullis holding and
"' Id. at 1347-48. The plaintiff in Mullis alleged violations of § 10b of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), rule 10b-5 of the SEC, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5 (1980),
and § 5(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (1976). 492 F. Supp. at 1347-48.
In addition, the plaintiff alleged claims based on California Corporate Securities Laws, New
York business laws, the Commodity Exchange Act, and the common law. Id. at 1348.
The plaintiff based his claim on the defendant broker's miscalculation of plaintiffs
money market accounts that created a $150,000 shortage. Id. The defendant liquidated the
plaintiff's copper futures contracts from the plaintiff's discretionary account to cover the
shortage. Id. By the time the defendant discovered the mistake, the price of copper futures
had risen and thus the plaintiff lost the benefit of the price rise. Id. The plaintiff claimed ac-
tual and consequential losses totalling $849,300. Id.
' 492 F. Supp. at 1349. The defendant in Mullis moved to dismiss the plaintiffs allega-
tions for failure to state a cause of action. Id. at 1347. The defendant also moved to stay the
proceedings pursuant to an arbitration clause of the commodity account agreement. Id. at
1347, 1358-61. The court stayed further proceedings to permit arbitration. Id. at 1361.
" Id. at 1349-51.
,o Id. at 1350-51. The district court in Mullis relied on the language of § 2(a) of the Com-
modity Exchange Act and its legislative history to distinguish between agency jurisdiction
and court jurisdiction. Id. at 1349-50. In addition to the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the
CFTC, § 2(a) states "[n]othing in this section shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction confer-
red on courts of the United States or any State." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Besides the language of
§ 2(a), the Mullis court cited reports from the House and Senate indicating that § 2(a) only
preempted agency regulation of futures trading. See Senate Report, supra note 21, at 5848;
House Report, supra note 21, at 5897. The court concluded that the federal courts retained
jurisdiction to decide cases arising under federal statutes. 492 F. Supp. at 1350. But see text




504 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
,5 Id. at 339-40. The plaintiff in Westlake, an investor in commodity futures options,
brought a private action under § 15 of the 1933 Act and § 20 of the 1934 Act. Id. at 338-39; 15
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denied defendant's motion." Concerned that the plaintiff had no remedy
under the Commodity Exchange Act, the court stated that the applica-
tion of securities laws was necessary to prevent the plaintiff from losing
all avenues of recovery. 7
The continued existence of private action under the securities acts
is, however, an open issue."8 Mullis and Westlake are the only two deci-
sions after the 1974 Act to expressly allow private actions. 9 No circuit
court has confronted the issue, 50 but several district courts have refused
to allow commodity investors to bring private actions under the securi
ties acts since the establishment of the CFTC.5' In addition, at least two
commentators have rejected the contention that private actions under
the securities acts are still available.2
Investors seeking the protection of securities laws usually allege
that their discretionary commodity accounts constitute a form of secur-
U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t (1976); see note 47 infra. The defendant moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the plaintiffs options were not securities. See 504 F. Supp. at 339-40.
"s 504 F. Supp. at 345. The Westlake court held that the plaintiffs claims raised ge-
nuine issues of material fact which may not be dismissed in a motion for summary judg-
ment. Id.
17 Id. Citing 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 462, at 82,372 (1975), the district court in Westlake stated that commodities law has
no equivalent to § 15 of the 1933 Act and § 20 of the 1934 Act. 504 F. Supp. at 345; see
Overlaps, supra note 3, at 295. Sections 15 and 20 provide for liability of controlling persons
for aiding or abetting a violation of the securities laws. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t (1976);
Overlaps, supra note 3, at 295. Section 13(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §
13c(a) (1976) provides limited protection against aiding-abetting. Overlaps, supra note 3, at
295. The Westlake court, therefore, may have overstated its case in finding the plaintiff had
no other avenue of recovery. See id.
" Bromberg, supra note 19, at 795-96; see text accompanying notes 49-52 infra.
" Until the Mullis decision, no court made a distinction between preemption of SEC
regulations and preemption of securities statutes. See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 324;
Bromberg, supra note 19, at 795. But see Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733,
737 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (distinction between private actions and SEC actions under
securities laws anomalous).
See Bromberg, supra note 19, at 795. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have side-
stepped the issue of securities laws applicability by finding no security existed. See Curran
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 219, 222 (6th Cir. 1980); Hirk
v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99-102 (7th Cir. 1977); New Investment Medium,
supra note 1, at 272 n.2,4.
, Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co., 470 F. Supp.
610, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733, 735-37 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 435 F. Supp. 865, 868-69 (D. Conn. 1977).
The district court in Hofmayer is the only court refusing to permit private actions under
the securities laws that addressed the distinction between SEC enforcement of the
securities laws and private actions under the securities laws. See 459 F. Supp. at 737 n.2;
Bromberg, supra note 19, at 795 & n.28. The Hofmayer court reasoned that the distinction
would be anomalous. Id.; see text accompanying notes 153-58 infra.
" See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 324; Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, at
35-36; text accompanying notes 149-78 infra.
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ity known as an investment contract. 3 Both the 1933 Act and 1934 Act
include the term investment contract in the broad definition of
security. 4 The Supreme Court defined an investment contract in SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co.5 Subsequent decisions have construed the Howey
definition as a three-part test."6 According to the test, an investment con-
tract consists of an investment of funds, in a common enterprise, with an
expectation of profits based solely on the efforts of a third party.'
Courts have split on the question of whether a discretionary com-
modity account constitutes an investment contract. 8 Since all discre-
tionary commodity accounts include an investment of funds and manage-
ment by a third party, most courts have no problem satisfying the first
and third elements of Howey. 9 The common enterprise element of the
Howey test, however, is a source of major disagreement among the cir-
cuits."° Courts have adopted two conflicting approaches to define the
common enterprise element.61 Courts have expressed the two ap-
proaches in terms of either horizontal or vertical commonality.2 The
terms refer to the nature of the investment relationship that each ap-
proach requires to satisfy the common enterprise element.1
3
The horizontal commonality approach focuses on the relationship
See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith,.Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 219
(6th Cir. 1980); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik
v. M-S Commodities, Inc. 457 F.2d 274, 275 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(10); see Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967)
(definitions in 1933 Act and 1934 Act virtually identical).
- 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). In Howey, the Supreme Court defined investment con-
tract: "an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, trans-
action or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." Id.; see New Invest-
ment Medium, supra note 1, at 275-76.
1 See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC
v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1974).
5 See note 56 supra.
Compare Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th
Cir. 1980) and Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977) (discretionary
commodity account is not investment contract) with Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523
(5th Cir. 1978) and Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (discretionary
commodity account is investment contract).
" See Meredith 'v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) i
21,107, at 24,460 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1980); New Investment Medium, supra note 1, at 276 n.46.
The first and third parts of the Howey test are an investment of funds and an expectation of
profits based on efforts of a third party. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
" Compare, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d
216, 221-22 (6th Cir. 1980) (discretionary commodity account not a common enterprise) with
SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 520-23 (5th Cir. 1974) (reversing
district court holding that discretionary commodity account failed to satisfy common enter-
prise requirement).
"1 See text accompanying notes 64-72 infra.
2 See New Investment Medium, supra note 1, at 276-82.
See 622 F.2d at 221-22.
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among investors. 4 Under the horizontal approach, the success or failure
of one investor must be dependent upon the success or failure of his
broker's other investors. 5 Several courts have held that a pooling of the
investors' funds constitutes horizontal commonality.6 In addition, at
least two courts have held that the broker must actually pool the funds
rather than merely treat each investor's funds similarly."
A number of courts, however, have refused to adopt the horizontal
approach. 8 Instead, these courts have espoused the less restrictive com-
mon enterprise standard known as vertical commonality.69 The vertical
approach shifts the focus from the relationship among investors to the
relationship between each investor and the promoter." Under vertical
commonality, the common enterprise element of the Howey test re-
quires that the fortunes of the investor be dependent upon the efforts
See id. The Seventh Circuit developed horizontal commonality in Milnarik v. M-S
Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). The Milnarik
court held that discretionary commodity accounts lack the commofiality necessary to con-
stitute an investment contract because there is no joint participation of investors in an in-
vestment enterprise. Id. at 276-77. The Seventh Circuit refined the Milnarik holding in Hirk
v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977). The Hirk court required a pooling
of investors' funds to satisfy the common enterprise element of Howey. Id. at 100-01. In ad-
dition, the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff's contention that the defendant broker's
treatment of customers' accounts as if commingled satisfied the common enterprise require-
ment. Id. at 101. The Hirk court held that' the accounts were unitary in nature and that
similar trading decisions made for all accounts did not provide the necessary pooling. Id.
See 457 F.2d at 276-78; Discretionary Accounts, supra note 34, at 402, 406-07.
See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222
(6th Cir. 1980); Meredith v. ContiCommodity Serv., Inc., 2 CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107,
at 24,462 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1980); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066, 1069
(M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973); note 64 supra.
" See 561 F.2d at 101; 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107, at 24,462-63; note 64 supra.
" See, e.g., Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Continental
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521-23 (5th Cir. 1974); Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368
F. Supp. 486, 488-90 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
See note 68 supra. The Ninth Circuit developeed vertical commonality in SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
The Turner case did not involve a discretionary commodity account but rather a multi-level
distribution schema whereby each participant made money by recruiting participants in a
lower level. See id. at 478-80. See generally Note, Pyramid Schemes: Dare to be Regulated,
61 GEo. L.J. 1257 (1973). The Turner court defined the common enterprise element of
Howey as "one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent
upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third parties." 474 F.2d at
482 n.7.
The Fifth Circuit purportedly adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach in SEC v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 474 (5th Cir. 1974), and SEC v. Continental Commodities
Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit concluded, however, that the
critical factor of the common enterprise requirement was whether the "fortuity of the in-
vestments collectively is essentially dependent upon promoter expertise." 497 F.2d at 522.
The Continental Commodities court's language suggests a departure from the Turner
definition. See text accompanying notes i38-43 infra.
" See 622 F.2d at 221-24.
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and success of the promoter.7' At the same time, vertical commonality
ordinarily requires that the promoter's financial return correlate with
the success of the investor.72
In SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.,73 the Fifth Circuit espous-
ed a vertical approach to commonality focusing on the investor's
dependence upon the promoter's expertise.7 The court reaffirmed its ap-
proach in Moody v. Bache & Co.75 and cited Continental Commodities,
without elaboration, for the proposition that discretionary commodity
accounts can be securities.76 The Moody court reasoned that if the defen-
dant broker had discretion, the plaintiff was dependent upon the defen-
dant's expertise and thus the account could be a security under the
securities acts.
77
In Brodt v. Bache & Co., 71 the Ninth Circuit applied vertical com-
monality to a discretionary commodity account.79 In Brodt, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant induced them to open an account and, as a
result of the defendant's fraud and mismanagement, the plaintiffs suf-
fered excessive losses." The plaintiffs' claims included alleged violations
of the 1933 Act. 1 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal
7' See 474 F.2d at 482, n.7.
72 See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978).
73 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
" See id. at 521-23; note 69 supra.
78 570 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff in Moody v. Bache & Co. brought actions
under § 15(c)(1) and § 10b of the 1934 Act, the 1933 Act and the Commodity Exchange Act.
Id. at 524-25. The plaintiff's claims arose from a net loss of $86,000 from his account alleged-
ly due to defendant broker's incompetence and misrepresentations. Id.
Is 570 F.2d at 526. The Moody court "disposed" of the plaintiff's allegations that sought
to impose liability on defendant as a broker under § 15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act. See id. at
526-27. While the Fifth Circuit agreed that the plaintiff's account might be a security, the
defendant was an "issuer or seller" as to the account and not a broker. See id. The court
held, therefore, that since § 15(c)(1) applies only to security brokers, the defendant was not
liable. See id. at 527 & n.6.
See id. at 526.
78 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978).
78 Id. at 461. The Ninth Circuit first approved the vertical approach in SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973). See note 69 supra.
1 595 F.2d at 459-60. In Brodt, the defendants induced the plaintiffs to open an account
with representations that the plaintiffs would reap high profits. Id. The plaintiffs' situations
was not uncommon to commodity traders. See New Investment Medium, supra note 1, at
270 (investors generally lack experience and are particularly susceptible to broker
misrepresentations regarding profitability). Investor reliance upon his broker's misleading
statements is an element of a cause of action under § 18 of the 1934 Act. See 15 U.S.C. §
78r(a) (1976). Sometime after opening their account, the plaintiffs learned that all their
assets were lost, that their individual broker had left the defendant's employ and that the
company through which the plaintiffs purchased commodity options was insolvent. 595 F.2d
at 460.
", 595 F.2d at 460. Count two of plaintiffs' complaint, in Brodt, alleged violation of the
registration provisions of the 1933 Act. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a}(1), (c) (1976). The plaintiffs
also based claims on the 1934 Act, the Commodity Exchange Act, negligence, breach of war-
ranty, and misrepresentation. 595 F.2d at 460.
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of the plaintiffs' claims based on the 1933 Act on the ground that the
discretionary commodity account did not constitute an investment con-
tract." The court conceded that the investor's return was dependent
upon the promoter's managerial expertise. 3 The Ninth Circuit focused,
however, on the fact that the broker's success or failure was not deter-
mined by the investor's profit or loss.84 Due to the lack of correlation be-
tween the fortunes of the investor and the promoter, the court held that
the account was not a common enterprise and thus not a security."
The Brodt court implied that its vertical approach differed from the
vertical approach of the Fifth Circuit." According to the Ninth Circuit,
the Fifth Circuit's approach emphasized the investor's dependence upon
the promoter's expertise rather than the correlation between the inves-
tor's and promoter's success. The analysis of the Brodt court suggests
that application of the broader Fifth Circuit approach would have allow-
ed a finding that the account in Brodt was a security.88 The Ninth
Circuit's rejection of the Fifth Circuit approach and holding that the
discretionary commodity account was not a security indicates implicitly
that the Fifth Circuit's approach does not meet the common enterprise
requirement under the Howey test. 9
The Sixth Circuit recently adopted the horizontal commonality ap-
proach in Curran v. Merrill Lynch,"0 and, in doing so, rejected expressly
the Fifth Circuit's vertical commonality approach. 1 In Curran, the plain-
tiffs were investors in a discretionary commodity account managed by
the defendant. The agreement between the plaintiffs and defendant
See 595 F.2d at 461. The district court in Brodt dismissed the claim based on the
1933 Act because the court found that the discretionary commodity account was not a
security. Id. at 460. The district court, however, certified the question for an interlocutory
appeal. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) (orders of dismissal involving disputed controlling
questions of law may be certified for interlocutory appeal).
83 595 F.2d at 461; see note 69 supra.
" 595 F.2d at 461; see text accompanying notes 69-72 supra. The defendant, in Brodt v.
Bache & Co. received a flat commission not based on profits from plaintiff's account. See 595
F.2d at 461; text accompanying notes 138-42 infra.
595 F.2d at 461.
See id. at 461.
See id. In Brodt, the Ninth Circuit stated that its application of vertical commonality
in United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 563-64 (9th Cir. 1978), was "nearly" as expansive
as the Fifth Circuit's application. 595 F.2d at 461. The Brodt court strengthened the implica-.
tion that the Fifth Circuit's approach is more expansive by indicating that the aggrieved in-
vestor clearly was dependent on the defendant broker's managerial expertise, but held that
the account still did not possess the necessary commonality. See id.; text accompanying
notes 138-43 infra.
See 595 F.2d at 461; text accompanying notes 138-43 infra.
See note 87 supra.
® 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), cert granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1981) (No.
80-203). The petition for certiorari is limited to the Sixth Circuit's sua sponte finding that a
private cause of action exists under the Commodity Exchange Act. Id. at 3258-59, 3788.
9' 622 F.2d at 222; see text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
622 F.2d at 219-220.
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gave the defendant complete discretion and provided that commissions
be paid to the defendant based on the trading activity in the account. 3 In
addition, the defendant allegedly represented that to increase the defen-
dant's trading power the program involved a large number of investors."
As a result of excessive losses from the account, the plaintiffs brought
an action alleging violations of the 1933 Act, the Commodity Exchange
Act, state securities laws, and common law principles. 5
The Sixth Circuit considered both horizontal and vertical commonal-
ity." Finding the plaintiff's account identical to the account in a Seventh
Circuit decision that adopted horizontal commonality," the Sixth Circuit
ruled that the pooling of investors' funds is essential to the common
enterprise requirement. In addition, the court concluded that the Fifth
Circuit's emphasis on promoter expertise in Continental Commodities
effectively nullifies the common enterprise requirement and therefore is
inconsistent with Howey.9
Applying horizontal commonality, the Sixth Circuit held that the
discretionary commodity account was not an investment contract."' The
Curran court reasoned that the plaintiffs' account with the defendant
broker was independent of the broker's other accounts and therefore
that a common enterprise was not present. 1 ' The court also rejected the
plaintiffs' contention that the defendant's representations regarding the
pooling of investors' accounts satisfied the common enterprise require-
ment.1"2 The Sixth Circuit stated that regardless of defendant's
representations, the plaintiffs knew that they had no contractual ties
'" See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,862, at 91,131 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980). The most common type of discretionary account provides
that the broker receives a flat commission for each transaction, regardless of the profitabil-
ity of the transactions or the account as a whole. See H. Sowards, The Federal Securities
Act, 11 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 2.01[14] (Matthew Bender 1976); Discretionary Accounts,
supra note 34, at 403 n.15.
"' 622 F.2d at 220. The representations alleged in Curran included that the program
would involve several investors with an individual trader directing all the accounts. Id.
's Id. at 219. In Curran, the plaintiffs alleged violations of § 5, § 12 and § 17(e) of the
1933 Act, SEC rule 10b-5, and § 6(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act. Id. The plaintiffs
asserted that their accounts declined in value approximately $175,000. Id. at 220. During the
same period the plaintiffs had paid Merrill Lynch $44,500 in commissions. Id.
Id. at 221-24; see text accompanying notes 64-72 supra.
'7 622 F.2d at 221-22. The Curran court compared the plaintiffs' account to the account
in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887
(1972). 622 F.2d at 221-22; see note 64 supra. The Curran court found the two accounts iden-
tical except for the representations allegedly made by defendant. See 622 F.2d at 222; text
accompanying note 94 supra.
" 622 F.2d at 222.
See id. at 222-24; text accompanying notes 138-43 infra.
10 See id. at 222.
101 Id.
' See id. at 224-25; note 97 supra.
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with other investors."°3 Since the plaintiffs had understood the agree-
ment involved only a vertical relationship with the broker, the court
held that the expectancy of pooling did not raise the account to the level
of a security. 4
The federal district court for the District of Columbia recently ad-
dressed the status of a discretionary commodity account in Meredith v.
ContiCommodity Services, Inc.1'5 In Meredith, an investor lost $55,000 as
a result of trading in his account by a representative of ContiCommo-
dity.0 0 As in Curran and Brodt, the account broker received commissions
based on trading activity rather than on the investor's profits. 7 The in-
vestor alleged, among other things, that his account was a security
subject to the 1933 Act and 1934 Act.0 8 Noting that the sole deter-
minative issue was whether the account was a security, the Meredith
court reviewed the two approaches to the common enterprise require-
ment.' The district court concluded that the proper approach to the
common enterprise requirement is horizontal commonality."0 The court
ruled that an actual pooling of investors' funds is necessary for a discre-
tionary commodity account to be an investment contract."' Since the
other ContiCommodity customers' accounts had no impact on the plain-
tiff's account, the court determined that the account lacked commonality
under the horizontal approach, and therefore the account was- not an in-
vestment contract."2 In addition, the Meredith court noted that vertical
commonality requires the fortunes of the promoter to be tied to those of
the investor."' Since the defendant received a commission based on the
number of transactions regardless of the success of the transactions, the
Meredith court held that commonality was also absent under the vertical
approach."'
In its analysis, the Meredith court distinguished thp Ninth.Circuit's
vertical commonality from the Fifth Circuit's approach in Continental
Commodities."5 The district court reasoned that a discretionary com-
"1 622 F.2d at 225.
See id.
105 2 CoMm1. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1980).
1 Id. at 24,459-60.
127 Id. at 24,459; see note 93 supra.
' See 2 CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107, at 24,459-60. The laintiff in'Meredith
alleged violations of § 5 and § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77q (1976), § 10(b) of the
1934 Act, id. § 78j(b), as well as violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, common law
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. Id.
0 See id. at 24,459-61.
1 Id. at 24,462-63.
m See id.
112 See id.
11 Id.; see text accompanying notes 70-89 supra.
"1 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107, at 24,461. The Meredith court stated that
because the defendant was on commission, the promoter's fortunes did not rise and fall with
those the investors. See id.; note 96 supra.
"1 2 ComM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107, at 24,461-62. Compare Brodt v. Bache & Co.,
595 F.2d at 461 with SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 522-23.
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modity account invariably would be an investment contract under the
Fifth Circuit's approach because the plaintiff investor always depends
on promoter expertise. " 6 The Ninth Circuit, however, would require a
correlation between the fortunes of investor and promoter. " 7 In reject-
ing Continental Commodities, the Meredith court found the Fifth Cir-
cuit's approach so broad as to render the common enterprise require-
ment redundant of the third element of the Howey test, which requires
an expectation of profits based solely on the efforts of another." ' The
court concluded that the Fifth Circuit's approach was inconsistent with
the definition of an investment contract in Howey."'
Whether a discretionary commodity account constitutes an invest-
ment contract theoretically subject to federal securities laws 2 ' currently
depends on the characteristics of the account and the commonality ap-
proach employed in a particular jurisdiction. 2 ' Not all discretionary com-
modity accounts are identical because the underlying agreements be-
tween investors and brokers may vary in several respects. 2 Courts
have focused on two particular characteristics of discretionary commo-
dity accounts when determining whether the accounts are investment
contracts. 2 ' The determinative characteristics are whether the
investor's account is pooled with the broker's other accounts and
whether the broker shares in the profits from the investor's accounts. 4
A discretionary commodity account that is pooled with other discre-
tionary commodity accounts would be an investment contract under
both the horizontal and vertical commonality approaches. 5 The pooling
of investors' funds is the characteristic that expressly satisfies the com-
mon enterprise requirement under horizontal commonality.'26 While ver-
tical commonality focuses on a common enterprise between investor and
promoter rather than among investors, it is not the exclusive means of
satisfying the common enterprise requirement of Howey in those
jurisdictions adopting vertical commonality.' Vertical commonality pur-
.1. See 2 CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107, at 24,461-62; text accompanying notes
138-43 infra.
... See 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107, at 24,461; Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d
at 461; text accompanying notes 78-89 supra.
1 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,107, at 24,462; see text accompanying note 107
supra, and 138-43 infra.
"9 2 COMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107, at 24,462; see text accompanying note 107
supra and 138-43 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 20-47 supra and notes 144-73 infra.
"' See text accompanying notes 125-43 infra.
2 See Discretionary Accounts, supra note 34, at 403-05.
's See text accompanying note 124 infra.
12 See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d at
221-22; Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d at 461; see text accompanying notes 61-72 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 126-30 infra.
1 See 622 F.2d at 222; text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
1 See New Investment Medium, supra note 1, at 279-80, 289-90. Advocates of vertical
commonality promote the approach as a more flexible alternative than horizontal com-
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ports to remain consistent with the Howey test requirements and, at the
same time, be a less restrictive approach than horizontal commonality."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Howey found that an investment
contract existed in a situation that involved pooling without promoter
success being dependent on investor success."9 Even under the vertical
commonality approach, therefore, the common enterprise requirement
must be satisfied by a pooling of investors' funds, as well as an interde-
pendent venture between investor and promoter, to remain consistent
with Howey."'
Decisions adopting horizontal commonality have indicated, however,
at least two situations similar to pooling in which the investor-broker
relationship fails to satisfy the common enterprise requirement. 1 ' The
Seventh Circuit rejected a plaintiff's contention that the defendant
broker's similar trading decisions with respect to individual accounts
satisfied the common enterprise requirement.'32 The Sixth Circuit also
refused to find commonality where a broker had made promises of pool-
ing to his customers but did not actually pool the investors' funds."' -Both
decisions made clear, at least with respect to those jurisdictions follow-
ing horizontal commonality, that an actual pooling'is required to find a
'common enterprise."
Whether a broker depends on the success of his investor is the
critical inquiry in determining whether an account is an investment con-
tract under the Ninth Circuit's vertical commonality approach."15 A
broker is dependent upon the success of his customer's investment when
the broker's remuneration for managing the account derives from the
monality. See id. at 279-82. Vertical commonality's requirement of a common venture be-
tween the investor and the promoter satisfies the common enterprise element of Howey in
addition to horizontal commonality's pooling requirement. See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595
F.2d at 460-61; SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp. 497 F.2d at 522; New Investment
Medium, supra note 1, at 279-81.
" See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d at 460-61; SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497
F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974); New Investment Medium, supra note 1, at 290-91.
" 328 U.S. 296. The Howey case involved a citrus grove development scheme. See id.
at 295. Investors owned acreage but placed possession of the grove in an affiliate of the
developer through a service contract. Id. The affiliate company pooled and sold the produce
from all the acreage of the groves and then distributed the profits pro rata. Id. at 296.
" See New Investment Medium, supra note 1, at 279-80, 289-90.
... See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d at 224-25;
Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d at 101; Meredith v. ContiCommodity Servs.,
Inc., 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107, at 24,462.
1" 561 F.2d at 101. The Seventh Circuit in Hirk, stated that "'[a]s if commingled' is not
the same as commingled." Id.; see note 64 supra.
133 622 F.2d at 224-25; see text accompanying notes 101-04 supra.
", See Meredith v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107,
at 24,462. Since courts following vertical commonality do not require pooling, it is unclear
whether these courts would distinguish between actual pooling and situations that resemble
pooling.
" See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d at 461; text accompanying notes 78-89 supra.
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profits made in the account. 8 A discretionary commodity account in
which the broker receives a commission on a flat rate based on the
number of transactions therefore lacks vertical commonality because the
broker does not share in the investor's profits.137
Under the Fifth Circuit's approach to commonality, the pooling of in-
vestors' funds and the sharing of profits between investor and promoter
are not the sole determinants of whether an account constitutes and in-
vestment contract.138 The Fifth Circuit has adopted a modified vertical
commonality approach."9 The court has shifted from the requirement of
a common venture between investor and promoter to a requirement of
investor dependence upon promoter expertise.4 0 The third part of the
Howey test concerns, however, the correlation between the investor's
expectation of profits and the efforts of the promoter."' Since the Fifth
Circuit's approach requires no more than the third part of the Howey
test, the Fifth Circuit has effectively eliminated the common enterprise
element."4 A discretionary commodity account, therefore, would always
be an investment contract under the Fifth Circuit's approach because all
discretionary accounts satisfy the first and third parts of the Howey
test."'
A question more important than whether or not discretionary com-
modity accounts are securities is the fundamental question whether a
commodity interest that satisfies the definition of a security should be
subject to the securities statutes.44 The circuit courts have obviated the
need to address the fundamental issue by holding that discretionary
commodity accounts are not securities. 1' Although two recent district
' See 595 F.2d at 461; 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) q 21,107, at 24,461. The Brodt court
held that a discretionary commodity account lacked vertical commonality because the
broker's success or failure did not correlate with the investor's success or failure. 595 F.2d
at 461. In Brodt, the profitability of the investor's account did not determine the defendant
broker's commissions. See id.; note 96 supra. If the profitability of the account did deter-
mine the broker's remuneration, the broker would be dependent upon the investor's suc-
cess. See 595 F.2d at 461.
13 See, e.g., Meredith v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 2 CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,107, at 24,461; Discretionary Accounts, supra note 34, at 404-05.
"' See 622 F.2d at 222-23, 2 CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107, at 24, 461-62.
"' See SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 221-23; note 69 supra.
"I See 622 F.2d 222-23; 497 F.2d at 522-23; 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,107, at
24,461-62; note 69 supra.
1' See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 477; SEC v. Continental
Commodities Corp. 497 F.2d at 521.
M' Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Ohio
1979); accord, Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d at 223-24;
see text accompanying notes 115-19 supra.
1' See 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) J 21,107, at 24,461-62. A "formula" requiring only
dependence on promoter expertise to satisfy commonality would find all discretionary ac-
counts to be an investment contract because by definition such an account places trading
discretion in the broker's hands. See id.; text accompanying notes 140-42 supra.
'4' See text accompanying notes 20-52 supra.
1,5 See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d at 222;
Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d at 461.
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court decisions support the continued availability of private actions '
under the securities acts,146 several persuasive arguments oppose the
further application of the securities acts to commodity interest.147
Application of the registration provisions of the securities acts to
discretionary commodity accounts would be anomalous. 48 The 1933 Act
requires securities to be registered with the SEC in compliance with the
provisions of the Act and SEC regulations.' The CFTC, however, has
exclusive administrative jurisdiction over commodity futures accounts
under the Commodity Exchange Act."'0 Requiring the broker of a discre-
tionary commodity account to register the account with the SEC places
the broker in an awkward situation. The broker must comply with the
registration procedures of an agency that has no regulatory authority
over the interest to be registered. 5' While private action under the
registration provisions of the 1933 Act would be beneficial to a commo-
dity investor, 5' the regulatory confusion created by the application of
the provisions to a discretionary commodity account is unjustified."'
The legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the Commodity
Exchange Act is sparse and inconclusive with respect to whether pri-
. See Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp. 337, 345 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Mullis v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345 (D. Nev. 1980); text accompanying
notes 36-47 supra.
,47 See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 320-24; Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, at
35-36; text accompanying notes 148-73 infra.
148 See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 319-20; Bromberg, supra note 19, at n.26.
"' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(e), (f), (1), (s) (1976); text accompanying note 29 supra. Se ction 5 of
the 1933 Act makes it unlawful to sell or deliver unregistered securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)
(1976). Section 6 prescribes the method of registration with the SEC. Id. § 77(f). Section 19
grants the SEC authority to amend or rescind rules and regulations governing registration.
Id. § 77(s). Section 12 permits rescission to recover consideration paid for a security sold in
violation of § 5. Id. § 770).
" See note 17 supra. The Commodity Exchange Act does not require registration of
accounts with the CFTC. See Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, at 40-41; Discre-
tionary Accounts, supra note 34, at 414 n.70. The CFTC regulates futures trading by con-
trolling the contract markets. See Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, at 40-41. The
CFTC has authority to designate a board of trade as a contract market for trading futures. 7
U.S.C. § 7 (1976). The board of trade, however, must demonstrate that its designation will
not be contrary to the public interest. Id. § 7(g). See also Introducing the Regulator, supra
note 18, at 753. In addition, the CFTC requires the registration of commodityotrading advi-
sors and other companies and individuals that handle investors' funds or give trading ad-
vice. See 7 U.S.C. § 6(f), (k), (n); Introducing the Regulator, supra note 18, it 753. See
generally Russo, Commodity Trading Professionals, in COMMODITIES AND FUTURES TRADING
55 (Prac. Law Inst. 1976); Mitchell, The Regulation of Commodity Trading Advisors, 27
EMORY L.J. 957 (1978).
"' See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 320. The registration of a security has a conceptual
prerequisite that a security be amenable to registration. Id.
"5 See text accompanying notes 25-34 supra.
" See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 320; cf. Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, at
40-41 (context of remedy under § 12 of 1933 Act has no relevance to futures trading).
In addition to the anomalous jurisdictional situation created by requiring registration
with the SEC, the costs of registering would deter brokers from offering discretionary ac-
counts. See Discretionary Accounts, supra note 34, at 413-14 & n.66.
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vate actions under the securities acts remain available."4 Court decisions
favoring private actions under the securities acts have relied on the sav-
ings clause in section 2(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act that expressly
preserves court jurisdiction."' Congressional records indicate, however,
that Congress did not even consider the survival of private actions.'56
The primary reason Congress included the savings clause preserving
court jurisdiction was to assure the courts that the CFTC's exclusive
jurisdiction did not interfere with judicial review."7 Legislative history,
therefore, lends little support to the theory that section 2(a) permits the
courts to apply securities laws to those commodity interests found to be
securities.'
The adequacy of the commodities laws enforcement provisions also
obviates the need for commodity investors' private actions under the
securities acts."' In addition to the registration provisions, the antifraud
provisions of the securities acts are of most concern to commodity in-
vestors. 6' Commodities laws, however, contain several antifraud provi-
"' See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 319; Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, a
32-35.
'" See Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. 492 F. Supp. 1345,
1350-51 (D. Nev. 1980); note 40 supra.
158 See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 319; Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, at
32-35.
".. See Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, at 32. The broad new role of the
CFTC generated concern in Congress that the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction would displace
judicial review. Id. at 32-33. The remarks of Senator Talmadge indicate that the savings
clause in § 2(a) was to preserve judicial review:
The vesting in the Commission of the authority to have administrative law
judges and apply a broad spectrum of civil and criminal penalties is likewise not
intended to interfere with the courts in any way. It is hoped that giving the Com-
mission this authority will somewhat lighten the burden upon the courts, but the
entire appeal process and the right of final determination by the courts are ex-
pressly preserved.
120 CONG. REC. 30459 (1974).
"' See Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, at 35. While § 2(a) of the Commo-
dity Exchange act does not support expressly the continued availability of private actions
under the securities acts, the section does not exclude the possibility. Commentators advo-
cating the availability of private actions under the securities acts have argued that since the
Commodity Exchange Act does not exclude the remedy expressly, the private action
remedy continues to exist. See Hudson, Customer Protection in the Commodity Futures
Market, 58 B.U.L. REV. 1, 39 (1978); Hewitt, supra note 18, at 319.
"' See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 321-24; Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, at
35-36.
"o See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 320-21; Overlaps, supra note 3, at 288-96, 310. The anti-
fraud provisions of the securities acts offer the commodity investors certain advantages
over the antifraud provisions of commodities laws. See Overlaps, supra note 3, at 288; text
accompanying notes 25-34 supra. The historial differences in the development of com-
modities markets and securities exchanges and the regulatory approaches employed in each
field are in large part responsible for the differences in antifraud protection. See Overlap,
supra note 3, at 288-96; Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, at 36-42.
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sions 6 and other workable ,enforcement mechanisms.' In addition to
CFTC enforcement, private parties have an administrative remedy
known as a reparation proceeding."3 Under section 14(a) of the Commo-
dity Exchange Act, aggrieved commodity investors may bring com-
plaints of alleged violations of the Act or of CFTC regulations before an
administrative law judge."' Under the reparations mechanism, the
CFTC has the authority to award money damages.61 The securities acts
have no counterpart to the reparation proceedings. 66 Additionally, sec-
tion 5a(11) of the Commodity Exchange Act provides investor recourse
to arbitration.'67 Thus, the remedies available under commodities laws
make the application of securities laws to commodity interests un-
necessary. 6 '
The need to develop commodities case law independent of securities
case law outweighs the protection private parties receive from actions
under the securities acts.69 The CFTC's ability to establish and enforce
broad regulatory policies uniformly and consistently could be under-
18 See note 31 supra. See generally Nathan and Spindel, "I'm Guilty of
What?'-Emerging Concepts of Commodities Fraud, 35 Bus. LAw. 811 (1980).
" See Rainbolt, Regulating the Grain Gambler and His Successors, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1, 18-20 (1977). The CFTC's enforcement powers include the authority to withdraw or sus-
pend a board of trade's designation as a contract market, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7b, 8(a) (1976), and .
deny violators access to the markets, id. §§ 9, 12c. In addition, the CFTC may seek injunc-
tions or restraining order in the courts, id. § 13a-1, assess fines up to $100,000, id. § 13a,
disapprove contract market bylaws, rules, and regulations, id. § 7a(12), and refer criminal
violations of the Commodity Exchange Act to the Department of Justice, id. § 13a.
Moreover, the Department of Justice can seek imposition of criminal penalties up to
$100,000. Id. at 13(a(c), 13b. See generally Schief, Enforcement, in COMMODITIES AND
FUTURES TRADING 227 (Prac. Law Inst. 1976).
' 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1976); see Hewitt, supra note 18, at 322. See generally Graham,
Special "Reparations" Actions, 35 Bus. LAW. 773 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Graham];
Rosen, Reparation Proceedings Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1005
(1978).
18 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976).
10 Id. The reparation proceedings under the Commodity Exchange Act are unique
from other administrative reparation proceedings in two respects. See Graham, supra note
163, at 773-74. First, the CFTC's reparation proceeding can result in money damages. 7
U.S.C. § 18(e) (1976). Second, the CFTC's determination in a reparation proceeding is not
subject to de novo review by the courts. See 7 U.S.C. § 18(g); Graham, supra note 163, at
774.
1 Hewitt, supra note 18, at 332 & n.177.
18 7 U.S.C, § 7a(11) (1976); see Hewitt, supra note 18, at 322-23. Section 5a(11) of the
Commodity Exchange Act requires that the designated contract market provide an arbitra-
tion procedure for aggrieved investors. Id. at 322. The CFTC promulgated rule 180.3 to en-
sure that investors submit to arbitration voluntarily and not as a result of fine print in the
account agreement with his broker. 17 C.F.R. § 180Z (1980); see Hewitt, supra note 18, at
323. See generally Schneider, Commodities Law and Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 6
HOFSTRA L. REV. 129 (1977).
18 Hewitt, supra note 18, at.321-24; see text accompanying notes 159-167 supra.
18 See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 321-22; text accompanying notes 170-173 infra.
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mined by continued private actions under the securities acts.7 0 The same
fundamental differences between commodities laws and securities laws
that prompted Congress to place regulatory authority in the CFTC
rather than the SEC also disfavor application of securities case law to
commodities cases. 7' Any advantages securities case law offers to com-
modity investors should not be utilized by application of securities laws
but rather by development of commodities case law.7 2 Separation of the
two bodies of law would also encourage recognition of each body's uni-
que characteristics.'
In conclusion, the courts have not fully come to grips with the
jurisdictional overlap between commodities and securities. If the courts
choose a course that permits private actions under the securities acts,
then the question of whether a discretionary commodity account is a
security becomes crucial. If the courts, however, choose not to permit
private actions under the securities acts, then whether or not a discre-
tionary commodity account is a security is largely academic. The ap-
parent reluctance of the circuits to address the issue of the availability
of private actions under the securities acts may keep the question of
private actions open for some time. As commodities case law develops,
however, commodity investors will no' longer need to pursue actions
under the securities acts and the issue of private actions will resolve
itself.
GLENN S. THOMAS
170 See Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, at 35-36. The CFTC's regulatory
authority is very broad and the standards Congress provided are general. See id. Adminis-
tration of regulatory policy therefore must be relatively consistent and uniform. See id.
Conflicting court holdings in private actions under statutes other than the Commodity Ex-
change Act could disrupt consistency in regulatory policy. See id.
"' See note 18 supra.
7 See Preemption as Public Policy, supra note 30, at 41.
1 See Hewitt, supra note 18, at 322 & n.176.
